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Do you call yourself a feminist? If so, you’re in the minority. According to one poll, only 18 
percent of Americans use that word to describe themselves.1 Why so few? In part, it may be 
because harsh stereotypes of feminists abound. Feminists are angry, loud-mouthed man-haters 
who want women to rule the world, right? If this is what it means to be a feminist, few people will 
proudly claim the label. But this raises the question: What does it mean to be a feminist today?  
It may be a sign of women’s progress that a growing number of people have begun to 
question the need for feminism.2 Indeed, contemporary feminists would be remiss to deny the 
great strides women have made since the movement’s origins in the late eighteenth century. Not 
that long ago, women couldn’t vote, own property, pursue an education, file for divorce, or 
legally accuse their husbands of rape. It’s thanks to feminism’s forerunners that Western women 
no longer endure such formal disadvantages. Yet we’d be equally remiss to deny the ongoing 
reality of gendered violence and oppression in Western society today. Feminism remains vitally 
important.  
This chapter presents the case for Western feminism, with a particular focus on the 
American campus context. I focus on the American context not because feminism is most urgent 
here, but because the argument for feminism elsewhere is relatively easier to make. In many parts 
of the world, feminists are still battling women’s hunger, child marriage, forced female genital 
cutting, female infanticide, compulsory veiling, the widespread lack of education for girls, and 
more. If there’s a legitimate controversy about the importance of feminism, it’s in places where 
these problems have largely (though not entirely!) been addressed.3 
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1. What Is Feminism?  
“I’m automatically attracted to beautiful [women]—I just start kissing them. It’s like a magnet. 
Just kiss. I don’t even wait. And when you’re a star they let you do it. You can do anything. . . . 
Grab them by the pussy. You can do anything.”4 Many feminists were dismayed when they 
heard presidential candidate Donald Trump utter these words. After all, the refusal to “even 
wait” to kiss or grab a woman demonstrates an overt disregard for her agency and an egregious 
abuse of power. That he was elected regardless suggested to many that Trump’s disrespectful 
attitude toward women may be widespread. Indeed, it’s telling that Trump excused himself not 
by suggesting that he’d made an idiosyncratic, one-off remark. Instead, Trump noted the 
prevalence of such talk, or “locker room banter” as he called it, stating that, “Bill Clinton has said 
far worse to me on the golf course.”5 
Regardless of what Bill Clinton may or may not have said, Trump is certainly correct that 
he’s far from alone in treating women as sex objects. We can say that a person is treated as a sex 
object when she’s used as a tool for another’s sexual purposes without her consent.6 To be kissed, 
groped, or penetrated without your consent is to be seriously violated; it’s to be treated less like a 
self-ruling agent and more like a thing. Women today routinely face such violations, whether 
they take the form of sexual harassment, assault, or rape. The size of the recent #MeToo 
movement demonstrates this point vividly. In the wake of revelations of widespread sexual abuse 
by Hollywood producer Harvey Weinstein, millions of women across varying levels of privilege 
joined together online to share their experiences of sexual harassment, sexual discrimination, and 
sexual violence with the Twitter hashtag “Me Too.” Individual stories range in severity, but the 
ubiquity of accusations points to an overwhelmingly common experience of violation at the 
hands of men. In addition to these harms, feminists identify other forms of violence that 
disproportionately target women as a group, such as marital rape (not made illegal in the United 
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States until 1993), coercive controlling violence or “intimate terrorism,”7 and intimate partner 
homicide.8 
Such realities have led many feminists to conclude that women are oppressed. In fact, 
Marilyn Frye calls this “a fundamental claim of feminism.”9 But what does it mean to be 
oppressed? Feminist Daniel Silvermint offers a helpful definition: a person is oppressed when 
their objective well-being is pervasively and wrongfully hindered. Objective well-being refers to 
those elements that make life better, such as “having self-respect, making progress in your plans 
and projects, being happy, experiencing connection, having and exercising autonomy, being 
secure, being healthy, and possessing at least some items of material value or other valuable 
external goods.”10 If any of these elements is pervasively and wrongfully hindered, this view says 
that you are oppressed.  
Consider the prevalence of sexual violence against women on campus.11 While individual 
reactions to rape vary, victims tend to suffer a host of deleterious physical, emotional, and 
behavioral consequences, collectively termed “rape trauma syndrome.”12 As a result, many 
elements of victims’ objective well-being are compromised—for example, their ability to have 
self-respect, exercise autonomy, make progress in their plans, be happy, or be secure. Not only 
that, but the prevalence of rape is just one element of a larger “rape culture.” Rape culture refers 
to the normalization of women’s sexual violability in Western culture, as seen in widespread 
depictions of coercive sexual interactions with women in mainstream pornography, music, film, 
and more. For many feminists, rape culture, sexism, and ongoing violence against women 




But what exactly does it mean to say women as a group are oppressed? Is the queen of 
England oppressed?13 If so, does her oppression share anything in common with that of a 
disabled white mother on welfare? Or a Hispanic trans woman in prison? Feminists have 
theorized women’s oppression since the dawn of the nineteenth century. But it was early black 
feminists who first noted the shortcomings with stand-alone treatments of sexism—and thus the 
need for intersectionality. It may be fine for the law to treat black men as victims of racism, or white 
women as victims of sexism. But how should the law treat black women? Since black women are 
not black or women—but rather black women—to treat them as victims of sexism alone (or racism 
alone) risks erasing their experience at the intersection. Indeed, this is precisely what happened in 
the 1970s when General Motors was brought up on charges of discrimination against black 
women employees.14 In its defense, General Motors claimed it did not discriminate against blacks 
or women—it employed black men and white women. General Motors escaped discrimination 
charges only because black women are neither black men nor white women. Positioned at the 
intersection, black women were ignored.  
In their battle against oppression, modern feminists pull from these insights. They 
maintain that an adequate feminism must acknowledge that gender is raced and race is 
gendered, while appreciating also that race and gender intersect with further aspects of identity—
such as religion, age, class, ethnicity, and sexuality. In other words, modern feminism 
acknowledges that “a real-life person is not . . . a woman on Monday, a member of the working 
class on Tuesday, and a woman of African descent on Wednesday.”15 Today’s feminists thus 
respond to the charge that past feminists purported to speak for all women while in fact speaking 
only for a particular type of woman—namely, a white, middle-class, heterosexual, and cisgender 
one. In so doing, modern feminism cautions against simple generalizations that lump all women 
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together under the heading “oppressed,” including the queen, the mother on welfare, and the 
trans woman in prison. After all, the queen’s experience of her gender is inextricably bound up 
with her royal status. Is she oppressed, let alone in any way that resembles the experience of the 
mother on welfare, or the trans woman in prison? Such examples motivate intersectional 
feminism’s rejection of sweeping claims about the oppression of any one group such as “women,” 
since oppression is experienced differently—or not at all—by a group’s different members. Thus 
enlarged in scope, modern feminism is best defined as the intersectional movement to combat 
gender oppression. 
2. Gender Oppression  
With this background in mind, we can begin to explore some manifestations of gender 
oppression in the West. Consider first the prevalence of the gender binary. The gender binary says 
there are only two biological sexes (male and female) that correspond to only two gender 
expressions (masculine and feminine) and only two gender roles (man and woman). The gender 
binary is also heteronormative—it says heterosexuality is natural and normal for men and women. 
Consider what people sometimes say to a pregnant friend upon discovering their fetus is sexed 
male. The fetus kicks and a friend exclaims, “He’s going to be a football player!” Together, the 
friends fantasize about the child’s future, and the kind of woman he may one day marry. Based 
only on the fetus’s assigned sex, a host of assumptions about the future child’s gender identity, 
expression, and sexual orientation are made. If this sounds like a familiar narrative, it’s because it 
reflects the gender binary—the dominant view of gender in our culture’s imaginary.  
Importantly for contemporary feminists, the gender binary is also punitive; it deems any 
deviation from itself abnormal or wrong, with oppressive, violent, and even fatal consequences 
for those who don’t conform—such as lesbian, gay, bisexual, intersex,16 transgender, and 
genderqueer individuals. Those who deviate in less overt ways from the gender binary are also 
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punished for doing so, such as cisgender heterosexual women and men who defy expected norms 
of feminine or masculine expression. For example, feminist philosopher Kate Manne argues that 
misogyny is best understood as the set of negative consequences visited upon women who violate 
norms of “good” femininity. These norms suggest that ideal women serve the dominant men in 
their lives with various goods such as adoration, praise, sexual services, food, comfort, and so 
on.17 “Good” women are “men’s attentive, loving subordinates.”18 These aren’t the women 
misogyny targets. To the contrary, women who play the part of men’s attentive, loving 
subordinates are rewarded — not punished. “Bad” women, on the other hand, violate these 
expectations—and are punished as a result. 
Consider, for instance, the disparate reactions to women versus men in positions of 
authority on campus. Some studies have found that students give lower ratings to instructors they 
believe are women as opposed to men.19 Another study suggests that women professors are rated 
more highly when they conform to feminine gender expectations such as being nurturing.20 This 
same study also found that students use gender-specific derogatory language to describe women 
professors they dislike, such as “bitch, bitchy, bitch toward male students, witch, and feminazi.”21 
Such language suggests that students are disappointed in their women professors not simply as 
professors but as women who fail to live up to norms of “good” femininity.22  
Norms of “good” femininity are also at play in campus sex. Indeed, attention to norms of 
“good” femininity complicates all-too-simple discussions of campus sex that focus nearly 
exclusively on the buzzword consent. Granted, affirmative consent is important — consent that is 
conscious, unambiguous, and voluntary. However, feminism also reminds us that campus sex 
takes place in a wider social context that teaches women to please or submit in line with norms of 
“good” femininity. This means that women may sometimes consent to sex not because they truly 
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want it. Rather, they may consent to sex because they want to please men, serve men, or avoid 
negative consequences such as being called a “tease” or a “prude” by disappointed men.    
The gender binary also pressures women to adhere to expensive, time-consuming, and 
stringent standards of feminine appearance. Mirror space in women’s bathrooms can resemble a 
veritable battleground shortly before an off-campus party. Whether women obey or resist 
feminine appearance norms, several elements of their well-being may be hindered, including 
their happiness, health, self-respect, self-determination, and even employment prospects.23  
For instance, sexualized depictions of extremely thin women pervade the media so much 
so that we often see them in inapt contexts, such as advertisements for food and cars. Or, 
consider feminine beauty norms like the expectation to “prettify” yourself by shaving your legs, 
waxing your eyebrows, dyeing your hair, manicuring your nails, or wearing makeup. Across race 
and class lines, women devote countless hours (not to mention funds) to cultivating their 
appearance because the beauty industry tells them their natural bodies are inadequate. In 
addition to such pressures, common practices like catcalling or ranking women on a ten-point 
scale of “hotness” also cause many women to feel they are undergoing a constant evaluation of 
their appearance. Unsurprisingly, women internalize these constant messages, often with dire 
consequences; ongoing media and social pressure to be thin and sexy has been linked to the high 
prevalence of eating disorders like anorexia and bulimia among women.24  
To appreciate some especially oppressive effects of the gender binary, let’s look to those 
who are gender variant, such as transgender and genderqueer people. Transgender people’s gender 
identity differs from that typically associated with their birth-assigned sex. This is in contrast to 
cisgender people—the Latin cis meaning “on the same side as.” For example, if you were 
designated male at birth and identify as a woman, you are transgender. If you were designated 
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male at birth and identify as a man, you are cisgender. Some trans people reject the traditional 
gender binary entirely and identify as neither exclusively a man nor a woman; these people are 
genderqueer.25 Consider now the prevalence of transphobia—prejudice against trans people. 
Trans people widely report experiences of harassment and discrimination from many sources 
such as housing facilities, employers, health care providers, police officers, and retail store 
owners.26 Such harassment and discrimination hinder many elements of trans people’s well-being 
such as their happiness, health, financial security, and safety. For instance, compared to the 
general US population, trans people experience twice the rate of poverty and three times the rate 
of unemployment.27 Trans people are also overrepresented in jails, prisons, and detention 
centers, where they may be placed in gender-inappropriate facilities and suffer physical or sexual 
assault.28 Finally, according to a survey by the National Center for Transgender Equality, trans 
people are a staggering nine times more likely than the general US population to attempt 
suicide.29  
As an intersectional approach would predict, identity factors also complicate which trans 
individuals experience the most oppression. For instance, trans people of color and trans people 
with disabilities report even higher rates of poverty and unemployment.30 As Peter Cava 
explains, trans people experience varying degrees of oppression based on their “race, class, 
physical ability, mental ability, sexual orientation, age, religion, nationality, immigration status, 
body size, and other identities. It also matters whether we are transfeminine or transmasculine, 
whether we live as trans part-time or full-time, whether we transition hormonally, whether we 
transition surgically, and whether we are read as members of our self-identified genders.”31 In 
other words, not all trans people face similar obstacles, and the ones they do face are significantly 
shaped by their particular identities.  
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In keeping with contemporary feminist theory, feminist activism on campus has also 
become notably more intersectional. On Valentine’s day, for instance, many college campuses 
participate in V-Day—a global movement to end violence against women. V-Day was started by 
activist and playwright Eve Ensler. As part of the event, many college campuses perform Ensler’s 
The Vagina Monologues—a celebrated political play about women’s experiences with sex, rape, 
sexual assault, childbirth, menstruation, vaginal health, and more. However, students across 
campuses have sought to add a more diverse set of experiences to Ensler’s original production, 
first performed in 1996.32 On my own campus for instance, students organized a remixed version 
of the play to include selections by women of color, trans, and genderqueer individuals in an 
effort to draw attention to varied gender identities and expressions. Indeed, it’s crucial to 
acknowledge the experiences of trans and genderqueer students in campus discussions about 
sexual violence and assault; according to one recent study, the highest rates of sexual assault and 
misconduct were reported by female, transgender, and genderqueer students.33  
Feminist analyses are more successful when they theorize oppression through an 
intersectional lens. The more attentive feminists are to the differences among us, the more 
accurate our feminism will be. For instance, like feminists of the past, feminists today are 
sometimes criticized for offering theories of oppression insufficiently attentive to race and class 
dynamics.34 Others have invented terms to capture further intersectional realities. For instance, 
Moya Bailey coined the term misogynoir to describe the sexism directed toward black women in 
particular. The term transmisogynoir was also invented to capture the fact that “Being trans comes 
at a high cost, but being black and trans can cost you your life.”35 But despite their observation of 
such patterns, intersectional feminists remind us not to assume a shared experience for all black 
trans women or all white cis men—or all the members of any group for that matter.  
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In sum, deviations from the gender binary have discriminatory and often oppressive 
consequences for those who don’t conform. However, whether you’re a victim of oppression also 
depends crucially on your particular experience as shaped by the many facets of your identity.36 
Instead of promoting blanket generalizations, an intersectional feminist approach highlights the 
internal diversity within groups in an effort to describe more accurately which people tend to 
experience the worst hindrances to their well-being.  
3. Challenges for Intersectional Feminism  
Intersectionality has been dubbed “the most important theoretical contribution that women’s 
studies . . . has made so far.”37 The explosion of intersectional theory in the humanities has been 
remarkable. Among the many disciplines that make use of intersectionality are history, sociology, 
anthropology, philosophy, ethnic studies, queer studies, feminist studies, legal studies, and the 
humanities more broadly.38 But major uptake of any theory comes with its own problems. One 
such problem concerns misapplications of intersectionality that reinforce a flawed view of 
identity. That is, although intersectionality is a tool that helps us understand oppression,39 it can 
be misapplied to foster oppositional, painful, or static understandings of identity.  
Consider one example. To teach intersectionality, many college campuses employ an 
educational exercise called the privilege walk. A privilege walk begins with all students standing 
in a straight line. Students take one step forward or back depending on how privileged they are 
with respect to a particular question. Is English your first language? If yes, step forward. Can you 
find Band-Aids the color of your skin at the local convenience store? If no, step back. Can you 
walk alone at night without fear? If yes, step forward. Can you kiss your partner in public without 
fear of ridicule or violence? If no, step back. At the end of a privilege walk, students are in a fixed 
spatial arrangement that visually represents their various degrees of privilege. The benefits of 
such an exercise are clear; it teaches awareness of how certain aspects of your identity make life 
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more easily lived. It also teaches students to think critically about parts of their identity they 
never saw as related to privilege.  
Yet there are risks too. First, the privilege walk threatens to teach students to divide 
themselves into two main opposing camps: privileged versus oppressed. If the “oppressed” are 
regarded as victims of the “privileged,” then sentiments of good will and generosity can quickly 
be replaced by sentiments of ill will and resentment. Consider an opinion piece in which one 
student wrote that “ontologically speaking, white death will mean liberation for all. . . . Until 
then, remember this: I hate you because you shouldn’t exist.”40 To be clear, such a reprehensible 
view is certainly not the guaranteed result of an exercise like the privilege walk. However, the 
“us-versus-them” thinking encouraged by such an exercise can increase the chances that fellow 
students regard each other as group enemies rather than individual peers.41 In brief, no 
educational environment can thrive if students are taught to homogenize or hate the members of 
any identity group—be it “Muslim students,” “trans students,” “cis male students,” “white 
students,” or what have you. 
A second drawback to an exercise like the “privilege walk” that attempts to teach 
intersectionality is the risk that a particular interpretation of your identity becomes all-
significant—to be a person of color is to be marginalized, and nothing more. What takes center 
stage here is an attachment to identity framed as injury—as painful deviation from the norm.42 As 
Wendy Brown explains, “in its emergence as a protest against marginalization or subordination, 
politicized identity thus becomes attached to its own exclusion. . . . [It] makes claims for itself, 
only by entrenching, restating, dramatizing, and inscribing its pain in politics; it can hold out no 
future—for itself or others—that triumphs over this pain.”43 In other words, though there’s 
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certainly a place for it, preoccupation with a wounded notion of identity can also preclude more 
positive ways of understanding it.  
A third and final drawback to the privilege walk exercise is that it risks treating identities as 
if they are just as fixed in space as the geographic arrangement of the students. On this model, an 
individual is pinned down, “boxed into its site on the culture map. Gridlock.”44 Obsessed as it is 
with fixing one’s place in the privilege–oppression matrix, the privilege walk risks blocking the 
potential for more fluid forms of identification.45 What do I foreclose about who I am or could be 
when I proclaim I am “heterosexual,” “cisgender,” “white”? Are we all reducible to the locations 
on the matrix that we declare? Are the labels we proclaim merely descriptive? Or, in repeatedly 
proclaiming them, do we risk prescribing a model for how we must live and identify? As Anthony 
Appiah warns:  
What demanding respect for people as Blacks or as gays requires is that there be some 
scripts that go with being an African-American or having same-sex desires. There will be 
proper ways of being black and gay: there will be expectations to be met; demands will be 
made. It is at this point that someone who takes autonomy seriously will want to ask 
whether we have not replaced one kind of tyranny with another.46 
With such scripts in place, we risk becoming attached to a pre-defined understanding of what our 
identities are and forever must be. 
Intersectional theory doesn’t force us into oppositional, wounded, or fixed identities—and 
perhaps the privilege walk can be taught in ways that don’t promote these identities. But like 






Intersectional feminism is a valuable way to understand oppressive power structures and 
overlapping axes of identity. It also improves upon past versions of feminism that were 
insufficiently attentive to the differences among women, as well as the many manifestations of 
gender discrimination and oppression. But although intersectionality provides a powerful 
diagnostic tool, it mustn’t be used to cement an oppositional, melancholic, or rigid understanding 
of identity. We must remain committed to a vision of the future that welcomes pleasurable, 
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